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TOIL OF THE FIRESTARTERS 
Peter A. A Ices* 
IN THE COMPANY OF SCHOLARS: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION. By Julius Getman. Austin: University of 
Texas Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 294. $24.95. 
Thomas Wolfe, probably slumped over a refrigerator top, formu- 
lates the toil of the teacher-scholar: 
In this, he told himself, he was just like most of the other piddling in- 
structors at the School for Utility Cultures, from which he had fled, and 
to which he would return to resume his classes in English composition 
when his leave of absence expired. They talked forever about the great 
books they were writing, or were going to write, because, like him, they 
needed so desperately to find some avenue of escape from the dreary 
round of teaching, reading themes, grading papers, and trying to strike a 
spark in minds that had no flint in them.1 
Wolfe's reflection was autobiographical,2 and that autobiography sup- 
plies the power of his character's observation3 - a power sensed most 
profoundly by those who have too confronted the "dreary round." 
Most teachers, however, do not respond to their experience the way 
Wolfe and his character did: Wolfe disliked teaching so much that he 
chose instead to write the great American novel, or a few of them.4 
The contemporary response of the cynical teacher-scholar is to con- 
sider the state of the academy from within and to despair of its decline. 
Teachers, and perhaps law teachers more than some others, are 
introspective,5 constantly thinking about their place in the cosmos, 
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A. 
1977, Lafayette; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. - Ed. I am indebted to Professors Harold See 
and Neal Devins for their comments on an earlier draft of this review and to my research assist- 
ants, Amy Waskowiak and Kimberly Ciccone, both J.D. 1995, College of William and Mary. 
1. THOMAS WOLFE, YOU CAN'T GO HOME AGAIN 16 (1940). 
2. Wolfe had been a rhetoric instructor at New York University in the 1920s. See DAVID H. 
DONALD, LOOK HOMEWARD: A LIFE OF THOMAS WOLFE 103-232 (1987). 
3. In his posthumously published Autobiography of an American Novelist, Wolfe acknowl- 
edged and responded to charges that his books were too autobiographical: 
I protested against this term ... upon the grounds that any serious work of creation is of 
necessity autobiographical and that few more autobiographical works than Gulliver's Travels 
have ever been written .... [M]y conviction is that all serious creative work must be at 
bottom autobiographical, and that a man must use the material and experience of his own 
life if he is to create anything that has substantial value. 
THOMAS WOLFE, The Story of a Novel, in THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN NOVELIST 
1, 19 (Leslie Field ed., 1983). 
4. See, e.g., THOMAS WOLFE, THE WEB AND THE ROCK (1937); THOMAS WOLFE, OF TIME 
AND THE RIVER (1935); THOMAS WOLFE, LOOK HOMEWARD, ANGEL (1929). 
5. There are, of course, books written about the trials and tribulations of other occupations. 
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some coming to Wolfe's conclusion, others less morose. In fact, as 
attacks on the citadel of higher education have proceeded apace, 
teachers themselves have often led the assault.6 While legal education, 
specifically, has, for the most part, avoided direct attack, higher educa- 
tion more generally is under siege.7 
One of the most articulate, thoughtful, and provocative representa- 
tives of the genre is Professor Julius (Jack) Getman's In the Company 
of Scholars. 8 Getman has "made it": he joined the faculty of the Indi- 
ana University School of Law in Bloomington in 1963, after a two- 
year term as a teaching fellow at his law school alma mater, Harvard. 
He visited at the University of Chicago School of Law in 1972 and 
then joined the Stanford Law School faculty in 1976. After only two 
years at Stanford, he joined the Yale faculty in 1978 and remained 
there until 1986, when he accepted the Earl E. Sheffield Regents Chair 
See, e.g., BEN HAMPER, RIVETHEAD: TALES FROM THE ASSEMBLY LINE (1991) (automobile 
worker); J.F. POWERS, WHEAT THAT SPRINGETH GREEN (1988) (minister); GEORGE F. WILL, 
MEN AT WORK (1990) (professional baseball players and managers). The relative glamour of 
these occupations as compared with college and professional school teaching is beyond the scope 
of this review. 
6. See, e.g., MARTIN ANDERSON, IMPOSTORS IN THE TEMPLE (1992); ALLAN BLOOM, THE 
CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES: DECON- 
STRUCTION AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN (1991); C.P. SNOW, THE MASTERS (1951). Other 
attacks have recently come from outside the academy. See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL 
EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991); ROGER KIMBALL, TEN- 
URED RADICALS (1990). 
7. 
Within that world [the world of higher education], integrity is dead, having succumbed to 
the death of a thousand cuts. Each cut small, and by itself, not fatal .. [b]ut collectively, 
they cannot be explained away; instead they stand as an indictment of the institution of 
higher education itself. 
ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 9. 
The university now offers no distinctive visage to the young person. He finds a democ- 
racy of the disciplines .... This democracy is really an anarchy, because there are no 
recognized rules for citizenship and no legitimate titles to rule. In short there is no vision, 
nor is there a set of competing visions, of what an educated human being is. 
BLOOM, supra note 6, at 337. 
Within the tall gates and old buildings, a new worldview is consolidating itself. The trans- 
formation of American campuses is so sweeping that it is no exaggeration to call it an aca- 
demic revolution. The distinctive insignia of this revolution can be witnessed on any major 
campus in America today, and in all major aspects of university life. 
D'SOUZA, supra note 6, at 2. 
Academic tenure for American professors is an extraordinarily self-contradictory phenome- 
non. A society whose view of things economic borders on cosmic significance grants a life- 
time of job security to a segment of its population least demonstrative of economic value .... 
In a society where "economic consideration" borders almost on religion, what it gets in 
return from professors, especially from the "academic" professors, is not worth the money it 
spends on them. 
JON HEUR, TENURE FOR SOCRATES 3 (1991). "It is my aim ... to expose these recent develop- 
ments in the academic study of humanities for what they are: ideologically motivated assaults on 
the intellectual and moral substance of our culture." KIMBALL, supra note 6, at xviii. 
8. Julius Getman is the Earl E. Sheffield Regents Chair at the University of Texas School of 
Law. 
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at the University of Texas School of Law.9 
The subtitle of Getman's book is both grand and revealing: The 
Struggle for the Soul of Higher Education. Of course, the struggle for 
the soul of the academy is a continuing one, just as "[t]he condition 
upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance .. ."10 
Perhaps because law professors are introspective, a great deal of our 
professional time is spent reflecting on, and often despairing of, the 
state of the legal academy. 
The life of a law professor is different, in numerous and important 
ways, from the life of any other university educator: law professors 
generally receive higher salaries than professors in other departments; 
law students necessarily have better credentials than most undergradu- 
ates; and, at least in the second and third years, law school classes may 
be smaller than undergraduate classes. However, in certain respects, 
the challenges and frustrations of the law teacher are akin to the chal- 
lenges and frustrations of the English professor. Thomas Wolfe hinted 
at them; Jack Getman reveals them. Company is the story of Get- 
man's disaffection with much that defines the legal academy - indeed, 
the academy generally. Company is a reflection on higher education 
generally, as Getman does not restrict his judgments to legal academe. 
However, Getman is a law professor; his teaching experience has been 
as a law teacher, and he has written as a legal scholar.1' This review 
applies Getman's observations and conclusions to law teaching, the 
source of our common experience, in order to test Company's currency 
from the perspective that the author and I share. 
Throughout Company, the author returns to a tension that, recited 
at length, begins to resonate like a mantra: the conflict between elitist 
ambition and egalitarian values.12 According to Getman, the mem- 
9. ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1993- 
94, at 429 (1993). 
10. John P. Curran, Speech on the Right of Election of Lord Mayor of the City of Dublin 
(July 10, 1790), in SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN... ON THE 
LATE VERY INTERESTING STATE TRIALS 1, 5 (Dublin, J. Stockdale & Sons, 2d ed. 1808); see 
also JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 479b n.2 (Emily M. Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968) 
("Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Attributed ... to Jefferson."). 
11. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The 
Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803 (1993); Julius G. Getman, The Changing Role of 
Courts and the Potential Role of Unions in Overcoming Employment Discrimination, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 1477 (1990); Julius G. Getman, Ruminations on Union Organizing in the Private Sector, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (1986); Julius G. Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy 
of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4 (1984); Julius G. Getman, The Midwest Piping Doc- 
trine: An Example of the Need for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 292 
(1964). 
12. Getman begins developing the elitism-egalitarianism tension on the very first page of his 
book, describing the conflict in terms of his experience, and he continues to weave this theme 
through the text as a foundation for his major premises. See pp. 15-17 (describing the tension for 
teachers between elitist egotism and egalitarian pedagogical methods); pp. 30-32 (distinguishing 
between traditional elitist rhetoric and egalitarian teaching); pp. 94-96 (showing the potential 
elitist-egalitarian conflict that exists within the key areas of appointments, curriculum, and ad- 
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bers of the academy are preoccupied both with their prestigious titles 
and trappings and, at the same time, with disseminating their message 
and its benefits to all in earshot, literally or figuratively. However, 
Getman's attention to the elitism-egalitarianism dichotomy ultimately 
obscures his vision. While it enables him to reveal the deficiencies, or 
at least the continuing struggles, of the teacher-scholar, his focus leads 
him to conclusions that may insidiously distract the academicians 
from their relentless, if self-absorbed, effort to find meaning in the mis- 
sion Wolfe and his character found vacuous. 
Company is a very strong book, a contribution to our understand- 
ing of higher education. It is sometimes depressing, even cynical, but 
consistently well and entertainingly written. It is also a provocative 
book. It demands a response from the reader who has invested in the 
academy. This review responds to Getman by disagreeing with some 
of his conclusions. Though he and I might well agree on a good deal 
concerning merit and injustice in the academy, I argue that the differ- 
ent ways in which we would cast our conclusions matter to the acad- 
emy's conception of itself, to the public's perception of our mission, 
and, ultimately, to the continuing struggle. 
I. WHAT HATH SOCRATES WROUGHT? 
It may be that the difference between legal study and the other 
disciplines is never more pronounced than it is in the classroom. At its 
best, law teaching - legal education - empowers. Once you have 
endured the Socratic method, so the apology goes, you can teach your- 
self anything. You have gained the power to appreciate how things 
work, to inquire, and to understand how your own conceptions and 
preconceptions are broken down, refined, reconstituted, and ultimately 
molded into understanding. Along the way you endure confusion, re- 
gret, self-doubt, and perhaps occasional embarrassment, but all to a 
purpose - all to gain the self-knowledge that will truly set you free. 
Getman recognizes that this ideal is too rarely realized, that in 
teaching, the unconscientious or less-than-brilliant professor may 
mask incompetence, laziness, and even ennui. Getman reflects on the 
educational experience from the perspective of both teacher and stu- 
dent, and he discovers fundamental deficiencies that deprive both of 
their due (pp. 11-14). He is bitter. 
Getman was educated at Harvard's law school and rails against 
what was done to him.13 His argument, however, goes beyond that 
missions); pp. 127-29 (describing the blatantly elitist but potentially egalitarian institutions of 
tenure and peer review); pp. 197-98 (criticizing the apparent elitist attitude that engenders aca- 
demic snobbery toward workers' education). 
13. 
I remain appalled and angry at the Harvard Law School of my day: its arrogant assumption 
of intellectual superiority; its social, intellectual, and professional rating systems; its limited 
1710 [Vol. 92:1707 
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personal experience to identify the fatal flaw of education: teachers 
prepare students for a life that the teachers themselves have rejected in 
favor of academia.14 That must be true because the academy would be 
something of an intellectual pyramid scheme otherwise: somebody 
must actually do; we all cannot teach. 
Standing alone, those judgments about teaching generally would be 
too sweeping and indiscriminate to inform thoughtful reform of legal 
education, so the author elaborates by juxtaposing effective with inef- 
fective teaching.15 He concludes that the classroom experience is a 
good one when the fit is right among teacher, teaching method, and 
student (p. 39). According to Getman, the methods for achieving this 
fit are various (pp. 15-19). Nothing groundbreaking there. Getman's 
book goes beyond previous efforts when he acknowledges what every 
teacher knows, but dares not disclose: personality is at the heart of 
teaching (p. 19). There is a fine balance between maintaining a thick 
skin, bolstered by fortified veneer, and caring enough about the class- 
room experience to be hurt by it. He understands that ego makes 
teaching possible, "a degree of boldness" (p. 25), especially in light of 
the teacher's greatest fear, the "fear of being exposed as an intellectual 
charlatan" (p. 25). The strength of his narrative here reveals itself in 
his reader's nodding assent. 
The conflict Getman describes may be exacerbated in the law 
school class conducted in any degree of the Socratic method. The So- 
cratic teacher assumes an artificial distance from the learning process; 
she facilitates self-revelation and is perhaps at her best when the stu- 
dents do not quite appreciate the method of her madness until its sub- 
tlety finally unfolds. It seldom works that way. The chemistry could 
only rarely be just right, even if teacher and students were each bring- 
ing all that they could to the exercise. So the law class works well 
sometimes and not so well others, serendipitously, Getman realizes. 
Indeed, it is a wonder that it works as often as it seems to work, 
focus; its overemphasis on professional competence; its failure to provide an opportunity to 
express other aspects of our intellectual ability .... 
P. 13. 
14. P. 14; see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and 
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (describing how the cynicism of law professors 
is transferred to their students, creating a generation of lawyers who question the legal profession 
even before they have entered it); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a 
Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 
(1991) (describing how law professors transfer their own cynicism to their students, thereby cre- 
ating lawyers who will ultimately be dissatisfied with the practice of law). 
15. Getman offers Professor Theodore Goodman, a demanding English teacher who taught 
Getman at the City College of New York, as an example of a good teacher. Getman reports that 
Goodman allowed his students to write about familiar topics and was "a model of scholarly and 
artistic integrity." Pp. 17-19. This stands in direct opposition to Getman's first teaching experi- 
ence at Harvard, as a first-year instructor, which he describes as frustrating and occasionally 
depressing. P. 23. 
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though it may seem to work because those making the assessment 
have so much invested in its seeming to work. 
Company boldly confronts us with the fragility of the classroom 
experience: we are practicing alchemy, and we dare not deny the pro- 
duction of gold nor acknowledge the lead. Why should the process be 
so imprecise, have this adventitious hit-and-miss quality? Getman of- 
fers a hint, and, if we are honest, we have known it all along: we are 
distracted. The very ego that makes it possible for us to go into the 
classroom and exude the confidence of knowing for certain the funda- 
mentally uncertain keeps us waiting for "the call." Jack Getman 
knew he "was destined for more important things than being a profes- 
sor at Indiana University";16 Thomas Wolfe knew he would write 
"great books."17 
Getman argues that the anticipation, the preoccupation with pro- 
fessional advancement, to a greater or lesser extent gets in the way of 
what we do. It gets in the way of our teaching because it requires us to 
formulate a persona; to try to live, teach, and write up to it; and then 
to wonder why the artifice undermines the teacher-class relationship. 
Certainly ambition may get in the way quite tangibly - for example, 
the class the teacher canceled to finish footnotes. Getman, however, 
confronts the ambitious teacher with the reality that ambition is more 
insidious than that - it gets in the way because it corrupts the crea- 
tion of that artificial personality that we march confidently up to the 
podium four or six times a week. 
II. WRITING IN ORDER TO TEACH OR TEACHING IN ORDER TO 
WRITE? 
Some people are law teachers so that they can write for a living; 
others write so that they can be teachers for a living. The distinction is 
not fine, and many law school appointment committees tend to be con- 
stituted of those who are looking for the writer willing to be a profes- 
sor in order to have the time to write rather than for the person who 
will write in order to get tenure. The writers are hard to find, and 
good ones even harder, but the cynic might conclude that quality is 
less important anyway. The reason it is important to these committees 
to find the writers who would be teachers rather than the teachers 
willing to be writers is because scholarship is currency in the legal 
academy, for teachers and institutions alike. Tenure comes so fast, 
often in less than six years; the incentive to publish is gone once the 
danger of perishing has dissipated.18 Publication may still matter to 
16. P. 27. Getman's tone here is self-deprecating. 
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
18. See Michael I. Swygert & Nathaniel E. Gozansky, The Desirability of Post-Tenure Per- 
formance Reviews of Law Professors, 15 STETSON L. REV. 355 (1986) (describing the need for 
post-tenure safeguards that will ensure productivity). But see Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kur- 
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the ambitious teacher, but the "get-to-the-next-level" ambition wanes 
with maturity, or perhaps surrenders to circumstance. 
Company recognizes the uneasy relationship between teaching and 
scholarship. While it may well be that the engaged scholar is a more 
effective teacher and that the excitement of remaining current in the 
literature animates the classroom too, it may just as easily be the case 
that the time and energy devoted to writing detracts from the prepara- 
tion that is the foundation of teaching.19 Though all teachers have an 
opinion about this, were we candid, we would admit that we do not 
know for sure the nature and extent of the relationship between schol- 
arship and teaching. It may well be that something has to give. If so, 
perhaps the ambitious law professor will focus on what will more cer- 
tainly gain favor with hiring committees at the better schools than on 
what will impress the students du jour. 
Just as we might recognize that determining what makes for effec- 
tive teaching is problematic, it is also difficult to discern what consti- 
tutes good scholarship. Truth be told, quantity is a pretty good 
surrogate for quality, our protestations to the contrary notwithstand- 
ing. A well-respected law professor, who has taught at a "top-ten" 
school, once shared with me his perception of the generally accepted 
standard of effective scholarship. By "effective" he meant the type of 
land, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 
325, 331-34 (arguing that, when fear of sanction is removed, incentive to publish increases). 
19. To come to terms with the scholarship-teaching relationship, it might be necessary to 
consider more carefully what we mean by effective teaching and what the scholarly perspective 
has to do with it. Recognize that there is no reason to assume that what makes a good teacher 
will necessarily make a good scholar, particularly in light of the fact that we are so uncertain 
when it comes to deciding what represents good teaching and good scholarship. Is a good 
teacher someone who makes the students teach themselves or someone who demonstrates all of 
the crucial interrelations clearly? Or some combination of the two? Is a good teacher someone 
who is entertaining? Is a good teacher someone whom the students "like" because she has a 
pleasant, perhaps self-deprecating manner? The questions could go on. 
Even more troublesome, after we have decided what makes a good teacher, how do any of us 
know that one or the other of our colleagues is a good teacher? Do we rely on the tenure com- 
mittee visits, perhaps three or more and probably "announced"? Do such evaluations focus on 
effectiveness, the evaluator's having read the assignment the class was to have read and knowing 
enough about the subject matter to appreciate subtlety and nuance? Do we defer to the students' 
judgment and read the course evaluations, assuming that students know good teaching when 
they see it and will not mistake a pleasant and entertaining demeanor for the ability to do 
whatever it is we think the teacher must do? 
If the thoughtful scholar-teacher reflects on it, she realizes that we simply do not know what 
it means to be an effective teacher. The dean's definition, truth be told, might recognize first and 
foremost the ability to keep the students from complaining too loudly, because complain they 
will - and at these prices should - from time to time about virtually every teacher. 
The concerned, or even simply egotistical, law professor (a tautology?) will care deeply about 
what students think of her, for several reasons. First, perhaps foremost, the egotistical may not 
be the most secure, and so the more egocentric the teacher, the more she may need the approval 
of everyone in a position to withhold it. In addition, because of what any teacher must do in the 
classroom - reveal a good deal of intellectual and emotional self - it is particularly painful to 
fail to live up to a high self-image before the consumers of that classroom persona. Indeed, some 
classes at some times may get to know a side of the teacher better than anyone else ever has; the 
interrelation may be that profound. 
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scholarship that will enhance professional opportunities. He con- 
cluded that the three crucial indicia are "quality, quantity, and genre." 
First, he told me, your stuff must be good. Say something (any- 
thing?) and make sure your cites are accurate and intricate. Next, you 
should write a good deal; get your name in print early and often. Now 
with those two criteria satisfied, you will get tenure. You may even 
move up a notch or two in the popular polls. However, to "make it," 
he said, you need to capture a distinct genre, if not a unique voice. It 
does not so much matter that you offer an idea that advances the liter- 
ature; just be philosophical or economic or otherwise obscure and pre- 
tentious and that should do. Those suggestions intimate the sense of 
Getman's despair over the direction of scholarship.20 
Perhaps it is in some measure a reflection of our uneasiness with 
that perception of the direction of legal scholarship that, when describ- 
ing a law school's mission, administrators appealing for alumni sup- 
port emphasize that their institution is first and foremost devoted to 
teaching, and scholarship merely enhances that primary teaching 
function. Most practicing lawyers would find most legal scholarship, 
at least the stuff that attracts attention among academics, to be curious 
and probably even silly.21 The alumni, however, remember teachers, 
sometimes more and sometimes less fondly than they first responded 
to those teachers in the classroom. 
To some extent, that dissonance between the focus of the students 
and alumni - that is, teaching - and the focus of appointments and 
tenure committees at the thirty or so schools that are second only to 
Yale - that is, scholarship - is a challenge to the legal academy and 
perhaps to the profession too. This a relatively new problem, one that 
has become current only in the last twenty-five years or so. Getman 
remarks upon the direction of scholarship and suggests an 
explanation: 
The gap between educated laymen and academic specialists con- 
stantly grows. I do not think the gap is attributable to the speed with 
which the frontiers of knowledge are being pushed back; instead, it re- 
flects the desire by academics to be thought part of a special, elite, intel- 
lectually rigorous world and the fear that, if what we wrote was 
intelligible, the claim would be more easily dismissed. [p. 47] 
It may be that Getman's conclusion is skewed by the elitism-egalitari- 
anism tension he emphasizes throughout the book. I am not con- 
20. Getman argues that there is a trend toward the esoteric and pretentious. These kinds of 
articles are not original but a deceptive twist on what has come before. He succinctly describes 
this period as one "where not publishing is rare but nonscholarship is common." P. 57. 
21. See generally Edwards, supra note 14. Some innovative scholarship is even criticized for 
its "brilliance." Professor Farber defines brilliant scholarship as the kind of scholarship that 
upsets conventional thinking in order to say something that sounds profound but could lack a 
reality referent. Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987); Daniel A. 
Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986). But see Pierre Schlag, The 
Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV. 917 (1987). 
1714 [Vol. 92:1707 
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vinced that scholars try to be elite, to maintain an artificial intellectual 
distance from laymen. I suspect that our writing has become more 
obscure because that is, to a substantial extent, what the market for 
our services has demanded as a result of relatively recent changes in 
the legal academy.22 The forces that have shaped the contemporary 
scholarly dialogue were developing during the years Getman was 
safely tenured at leading national law schools;23 he did not break into 
the law teaching profession during the time that determined the legal 
academy's present course. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, legal education was poised to 
expand substantially as the number of college graduates pursuing a 
law degree increased. Law school enrollment grew 14.5% from 1970 
to 1971, and the number of candidates receiving J.D.s or LL.B.s in- 
creased 15.5% during that same period.24 This follows a remarkable 
trend for the decade. The enrollment from 1961 to 1971 had increased 
127.6%.25 The best and brightest finishing college at that time, with 
degrees in English and American literature, political science, sociol- 
ogy, economics, philosophy, and interested in pursuing graduate work 
in those fields in order to secure tenure-track teaching positions in the 
country's colleges and universities, found that there were in fact places 
available in graduate school. The trouble was only on the horizon, 
when the work for the degree had been completed and the search for a 
college-level teaching position would begin. There were few jobs to be 
had; the early baby-boomers and Vietnam War student-deferment 
22. See, for example, Paul Brest, Plus Qa Change, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1993), stating: 
There is little question that the level of pretension has increased, but I doubt that the overall 
proportion of fatuous articles has. 
... The law reviews undoubtedly contain more abstract legal theory than they did thirty 
years ago; but they also contain articles that illuminate legal issues from various points of 
view - race, gender, economic analysis, and empirical social science .... 
Id. at 1949. See also George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Indus- 
trial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1929 (1993), stating: 
There is little question that the most significant development in American law of the past 
century has been the realist revolution leading to the broader understanding of law and legal 
doctrine as instruments of social policy.... 
This change in the understanding of the role of law, however, had important implica- 
tions for legal scholarship and teaching. Both had to be redirected necessarily toward illu- 
mination of the functions and philosophical underpinnings of the law. 
Id. at 1931-32. 
23. See, for example, Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the Major American Law School, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 2167 (1993), stating: 
Legal scholarship is significantly, even qualitatively, different from what it was some two 
or three decades ago.... [M]ore than anything else it is the interdisciplinary movement in 
legal thought, which began in the late 1960s and continues with unabated force to this day, 
that has transformed the character of moder thinking about law. Virtually every field of 
human knowledge is being mined for what it can contribute to our understanding of the 
processes of law and of legal issues. 
Id. at 2167. 
24. Millard H. Ruud, The Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A.B.A. J. 146, 146 (1972). 
25. Id. 
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Ph.D.s had taken nearly all of the tenure-track positions in the liberal 
arts graduate departments. Faced with the prospect of at least four 
more years of education and then no job to help satisfy the student 
loans, record numbers of college graduates decided to pursue legal ca- 
reers rather than unemployment. Colleges and universities expanded 
the availability of legal education in response to increased demand.26 
That, in turn, swelled the ranks of those holding law degrees. 
There was more than enough legal work to go around, and, by the 
early 1980s, the better students at the better schools had more job of- 
fers than they could ever have imagined. The times were indeed good 
for the legal profession. What impact did this development have on 
law teaching and the evolution of legal scholarship? 
To meet the increasing demand for legal education in the 1970s, 
waves of new teachers entered the academy, and they produced legal 
scholarship. In their writing they brought to legal scholarship the in- 
terest in the liberal arts that energized their undergraduate education 
and, for many, their pre-law-school graduate education. From the late 
1960s through the 1980s, alternative perspectives in legal scholarship 
emerged and matured.27 
When, by the early 1980s, the tenure track and tenured positions 
on law faculties were filling up or were already full, it became more 
and more difficult to get into law teaching. There were indications 
that the expansion of the legal profession could not continue even for 
the duration of the decade. At the same time, satisfaction among asso- 
ciates earning figures unimaginable just five years earlier waned as the 
demands of practice increased.28 
Throughout the 1980s, the competition for places in law school 
classes increased. Many students did some graduate work before ap- 
plying to law school, and many of those students, more mature and 
better writers, assumed positions on the law reviews of the most pres- 
tigious law schools. So, as the first audience for the submitted manu- 
scripts of the tenure-track assistant professors and, in an increasing 
number of cases, manuscripts of those seeking tenure-track appoint- 
ments, the boards of the law reviews were making publication deci- 
26. Millard H. Ruud, The Burgeoning Law Enrollment Slows, 59 A.B.A. J. 150 (1973). 
27. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1972); Arthur A. 
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 
(1967). 
28. See Katherine Behof, For Love or Money? Finding the Job You Really Want, STUDENT 
LAW., Nov. 1987, at 16 (pointing out the time demands of the law and the concomitant loss of 
independence associated with it); Joe Bower, Young and Restless. Lawyers Who Leave, BARRIS- 
TER, Summer 1986, at 55 (describing lawyers' feeling that they are not making a difference and 
would not have time to make a difference even if they still had the desire to do so); Barbara Raab, 
The $65,000 Answer: If Law Firms Are Sweatshops, Money Won't Make Them Tolerable, Says 
One New Graduate, STUDENT LAW., Nov. 1986, at 16 (recounting stories of young lawyers who 
dislike their jobs). 
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sions about articles that were increasingly less accessible.29 As 
Getman observes, "[r]esearch has become more esoteric, interdiscipli- 
nary, mathematical, and professionally oriented so that nonacademics 
are far less likely to understand or be interested in what is written" (p. 
47). His uneasiness is with manuscripts that draw on just enough so- 
cial science or philosophy, just enough pretention to assure the articles 
editor that the writer must know what she is writing about, and just 
enough references to other pieces in the genre to assure the review 
editors that this piece would "advance the literature." 
The student law review editors, of course, are not exclusively, not 
even primarily, at fault. It is the legal academy that has defined the 
law reviews, but law review editors have been willing accomplices. 
Getman points out the randomness of the entire process, highlighting 
the impressionistic fashion in which third-year students choose a ten- 
ure-seeking professor's article for publication (p. 48). 
Getman recognizes that legal scholarship has evolved in the years 
he has been teaching and writing (pp. 46-47). Law reviews that would 
have received 300 unsolicited manuscripts a decade ago will receive 
perhaps as many as a thousand this year. The substance of the articles 
has changed since the early 1960s as well. Ambitious pieces advocat- 
ing revolutionary reconceptions of the law compete for the very few 
lead article spots in the nation's most prestigious law reviews. An arti- 
cle applying sophisticated finance theory to reveal the incongruities of 
whole fields of the law competes for a place with an article offering one 
more gloss on the persistent "battle of the forms" issue. Moreover, 
both the finance theory piece and the doctrinal analysis piece compete 
with articles urging innovative political perspectives. 
While the breadth and depth of legal scholarship have become in- 
creasingly varied, the bases of comparison have become increasingly 
vague. Student editors are not the only ones facing this difficulty. 
How does an expert in finance theory judge the critical legal studies 
piece that posits the relativity of all value systems? For that matter, 
how does the criminal law scholar decide whether an article concern- 
ing bankruptcy preferences advances the literature? The task is daunt- 
ing, so it generally remains undone. 
29. It has been suggested that this inaccessibility is a product of the fact that these journals 
are published primarily so that the works can be written and not so that they can be read. Roger 
Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
1, 7 (1986). Further, law review editors are helped along in their views of scholarship by those 
on the tenure track who, as Getman realizes, have expended "[a] great deal of... effort ... 
determining when to submit articles, how to attract the attention of editors, and how to play one 
journal off another to obtain publication in the more prestigious ones." P. 49. 
Professor Cramton has argued that student-edited law reviews have lost their utility and have 
no standards by which to judge their contents. Cramton, supra, at 7, 10. Phil Nichols responded 
that Cramton was too quick to judge the institution. Nichols blamed any lack of law review 
quality on those who are submitting the articles. He also added that the lack of specialty in the 
student editor creates a blank slate that cannot be found in faculty- edited periodicals. Phil Nich- 
ols, Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Law Journals, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1122. 
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Most academics, if they are candid, will acknowledge that, at least 
outside their immediate area of expertise, they rely on a surrogate for 
informed judgment: they reach conclusions about the contribution a 
particular piece makes to the literature by relying on the status of the 
law review in which it is published or on the reputation of the author. 
Were the review in which an article is published a reliable indicator of 
its quality, there would be no problem equating reputation of a journal 
with the quality of scholarship that appears in it. There are problems 
with such an equation, but the present inquiry is not dependent on our 
resolution of them. It is enough to recognize that the legal academy is, 
to a significant extent, uneasy with the course of current scholarship 
and the law review system. That skepticism has an impact on the way 
that academics value scholarship. 
III. TENURE 
In light of the current state of teaching and scholarship, it is not 
surprising that the fabric of higher education, and legal education es- 
pecially, is most strained when members of the academy endeavor to 
agree on a judgment about qualifications. Perhaps the most passionate 
portions of Getman's book concern his reaction to the tenure cases of 
Professors Janet Lever and Adrienne Birecree. Neither was a law 
school teacher. But let us proceed from common ground. 
First, recognize that all tenure cases, at least all that involve the 
denial or near denial of tenure, are necessarily contentious. At those 
schools that make a retention determination some time before the ten- 
ure decision, it is rare indeed that all concerned agree that it would be 
better for school and candidate if the candidate not be retained after a 
vote of her peers. If the candidate were comfortable with that deter- 
mination, she would resign and avoid the vote. 
Second, law teachers, perhaps contrary to public - or at least 
some students' - perception, are reasonably compassionate, no more 
and no less so than generally walks the streets. Therefore, it is diffi- 
cult, even wrenching, for the group to decide that any of its number, 
even the novice, does not belong. That is particularly true given the 
consequences of a negative retention or tenure vote: the candidate 
may be out of teaching altogether, banished to compete for a position 
in practice without skills that have any currency in that arena.30 It is a 
30. It is difficult to move back into the type of sophisticated practice that offers the same 
lifestyle as law teaching if you have written the type of articles that most academics write and 
done little else during your "probationary" period. Getman recognizes this when he describes 
the consequences of a negative decision. Pp. 112-13. The extremity of these consequences is a 
function of our want of consensus, our indeterminacy: just as we do not always agree on what it 
takes to be awarded tenure, we do not know how to construe a negative tenure vote. See also 
Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical 
Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 191 (1991) (noting a trend in which 
law professors used to be primarily practitioners but are now primarily teachers who have never 
practiced "in the real world"). 
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frightening prospect, of the "but for the grace of God go I" variety. 
Third, virtually everyone who teaches at a school for six or even 
fewer years makes friends, and friends have trouble saying no to 
friends. There are consequences. The candidate may well have con- 
stituencies, groups that sympathize with him and are ready to see him 
as a victim in the event the retention or tenure vote is negative. Such 
constituencies may be quite passionate, and in law schools, they are 
lawyers, or, as students, incipient lawyers, who know an injustice 
when they want to see one. 
Finally, and of greatest concern for the current and future state of 
legal education, we have no reliable criteria of merit and, what is even 
more disquieting, no resolve to develop such criteria.31 Indeed, it may 
make little difference that we have no coherent standards, because 
there does not generally seem to be any real interest in applying crite- 
ria: we too rarely read each other's writing and even less frequently 
observe each other's teaching. 
Against that backdrop, Getman reviews at length his experience 
with the Lever and Birecree tenure cases to demonstrate "academic 
injustice" in the tenure process.32 He offers a clue to the source of the 
problem in his prefatory observation: "The injustice is generally com- 
mitted in the name of excellence, typically when the school or depart- 
ment considers itself great or on the verge of greatness and the 
credentials of the person being evaluated are suspect according to cur- 
rently fashionable elitist criteria" (p. 112). Getman thereby formu- 
lates the institutions that would deny tenure, and he plants the source 
of injustice firmly in the clay of the elitism-egalitarianism tension. 
Lever and Birecree were denied tenure, and Getman believes that 
the schools erred. He explains that virtually all, if not all, of the candi- 
dates' faculty colleagues and virtually all, if not all, of the candidates' 
students supported the tenure applications. Nonetheless, the adminis- 
tration of both schools denied the tenure applications of the two wo- 
men. In Lever's case, the denial was followed by legal action against 
the school (p. 118). Both schools based their decisions on the candi- 
dates' records of scholarship, each school finding that the candidate's 
writing was deficient, not up to the school's standards as those stan- 
dards existed or were evolving (pp. 115, 124). 
In his reaction to the two cases, Getman asserts that the candi- 
31. As times change in the law school, the standards upon which we have depended to evalu- 
ate scholars disintegrate. Professor Rubin states: 
These are not cheerful times for standard legal scholarship. . . . [T]he field is widely 
perceived as being in a state of disarray. It seems to lack a unified purpose, a coherent 
methodology, a sense of forward motion, and a secure link to its past traditions.... The 
field even lacks a conceptual framework within which to criticize itself. 
Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 
1835 (1988). 
32. This subsection of the third chapter is titled "Tenure, Peer Review, Excellence, and 
Injustice." P. 109. 
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dates' scholarship, teaching, and service were deserving of tenure, and 
he concludes that Professors Janet Lever and Adrienne Birecree "were 
victims of unconscious but powerful sexism" (p. 127). He levels that 
charge despite an express finding in the Birecree matter that gender 
discrimination was not in evidence33 and a failure of the reviewing 
tribunal in the Lever case to reach the merits of the gender discrimina- 
tion allegation. In fact, Getman reports that Lever had to allege gen- 
der discrimination in order to obtain judicial review of the tenure 
denial: 
Courts will not review the correctness of tenure decisions made by aca- 
demic institutions in accordance with traditional procedures. To get the 
decision denying her tenure set aside, she would have to demonstrate 
that the decision was discriminatory - that a male candidate with her 
record would have been awarded tenure. [p. 118] 
This may not be the best state of affairs for either the courts or the 
academy. 
IV. PROFESSOR GETMAN'S ERROR 
To realize excellence in the academy, we must distinguish. We 
must distinguish the work that advances the literature from the pre- 
tentious and stylish; we must distinguish on substantial and legitimate 
bases and recognize the development of important ideas. Getman's 
accusation of "unconscious" discrimination undermines our distin- 
guishing on legitimate bases. It exposes those who are willing to dis- 
tinguish legitimately to charges of insidious discrimination to which it 
is impossible to respond, and thereby makes it easier for even the most 
conscientious academician to withdraw from the continuing struggle 
for excellence, to abdicate the responsibility to build consensus. Those 
who charge discrimination must identify something observable in or- 
der to shock the unconscious out of their torpor and avoid trivializing 
the charge of discrimination, belittling those who have been, are now, 
and will in the future be victims of real rather than imagined 
discrimination. 
Casual accusations of discrimination may preempt the conscien- 
tious work, reflection, and judgments that are the academy's only hope 
of formulating substantial excellence, the excellence in which even 
Getman continues to believe.34 If you cannot vote "no" for fear of 
33. Adrienne Birecree filed a complaint with the Commission of Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, alleging gender discrimination and violations of her academic freedom. The committee 
rejected the gender discrimination charges and found that she had been denied tenure for legiti- 
mate academic reasons. P. 124. 
34. It is inappropriate to allege discrimination capriciously and condescending to charge that 
its alleged perpetrators have discriminated "unconsciously." That indiscretion becomes more 
troublesome when Getman observes that "[a]cademic defendants are typically able to explain 
even discriminatory decisions in objective academic terms. In addition, academic officials, for a 
combination of institutional and personal reasons, often bitterly resent and strongly battle the 
claim that they were guilty of sex discrimination." P. 118. We cannot take this argument seri- 
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being accused of invidious discrimination, it is more difficult to vote 
"no" and less likely you will do so. If you lose the freedom to vote 
"no," you lose the means to build consensus, to refine our conception 
of excellence. You surrender to the very "style" and "pretense" that 
Getman abhors and decries. 
Getman does not describe the Lever and Birecree cases as aberra- 
tions35 but finds in them the substance of insidious intent pervasive in 
academic judgments. Because the academy, in his view, perpetrated 
the injustice in the name of excellence, he questions whether excel- 
lence really has been corrupted in the academy: excellence in the pejo- 
rative sense is a function of elitism, he finds, not the result of the 
disintegration of consensus (pp. 128-29). The consequence of 
Getman's erroneous accusation is that he sacrifices excellence and 
makes it a code word for corruption by suggesting that it describes 
"unrealistically high standards" (p. 129). 
Getman disserves the academy when he alleges "unconscious sex 
discrimination." The accusation is incendiary, does not advance the 
inquiry, and does not get us closer to a definition of academic excel- 
lence that is considerate of the intellectual diversity reflected in our 
teaching and scholarship. However, from the perspective of the legal 
academy, a dynamic community, perhaps the greatest cost of conde- 
scending accusations is that they chill the very dialogue that is crucial 
to development of legal scholarship and of the legal academy as an 
institution uniquely postured to affect and improve the justice system. 
How is it even in the interest of those whose writing proposes the most 
radical ideas to have those who would criticize such ideas disengage 
from the discourse by recoiling from unsubstantiated allegations? 
On the one hand, once you accuse those who have reached a par- 
ticular conclusion in good faith (they believe) of not being conscious of 
their own insidious agenda, you preempt a courteous and worthwhile 
exchange. It is akin to the right-to-life advocate's promising to "pray 
for" the free-choice advocate: walls go up, and the scaffolding of con- 
sensus crumbles. On the other hand, if those whom you would dispar- 
age have not reached their conclusion in good faith, there is nothing 
"unconscious" about their insidious discrimination; it should be ex- 
posed as a conscious affront to the legal academy and to the integrity 
of the scholarly mission. Getman errs in not appreciating that distinc- 
tion and in allowing that error to undermine his conclusions about the 
tenure process and academe generally. 
The academicians who voted to deny Professors Lever and 
Birecree tenure may well have determined that the candidates' contri- 
ously. It would be more remarkable if professional academicians, some of the brightest and best- 
trained minds on the planet, did not resent such allegations and respond bitterly. 
35. "Each case also is a reminder of how often injustice in academic institutions is perpe- 
trated in the name of excellence." P. 128 (emphasis added). 
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butions to the community of scholars were not as valuable as the con- 
tributions that would have been made by others.36 Granted, it is 
difficult to rely on subjective rather than objective criteria37 and avoid 
altogether accusations of arbitrariness.38 However, it is clear that, es- 
pecially in the maelstrom that is contemporary legal scholarship, con- 
scientious scholars could differ. The measure of each scholarly 
community's differences may well be the measure of the differences 
among the faculties at different schools. In that way, different facul- 
ties will develop different personalities. So long as faculties are toler- 
ant, there will likely be several scholarly predispositions represented at 
most schools, as indeed, in the main, there are.39 
V. INTEGRATION THROUGH DISINTEGRATION 
The disintegration of consensus in the legal academy, perhaps in 
the academy generally, is a good thing - a very good thing. The 
contributions of scholars from alternative perspectives - law and eco- 
nomics, critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence - will improve 
the law and law teaching. Alternative perspectives will improve the 
contributions of doctrinal scholars who do not write in one of the 
evolving genres because it will keep them from making the mistakes 
that result from ignorance of different perspectives. So we all benefit. 
36. This, I would argue, is a proper standard. It is entirely appropriate for a faculty to deny 
tenure to someone who has not been productive if the faculty determines that there are candi- 
dates more deserving of a chance to succeed in the academy. The relatively anonymous applicant 
is no less entitled to the opportunity to thrive as a scholar-teacher than the less than successful 
untenured professor is to a secure position in the academy. It is, of course, easier for faculty 
members to feel compassion toward someone whom they have gotten to know over the course of 
several years than it is to recognize the right of the entry-level, and relatively unknown, applicant 
to take a place in the academy. 
37. A useful first step toward developing consensus with regard to scholarship may be the 
provision of criteria that demonstrate excellence rather than mere reliance on the adjective "ex- 
cellent" in tenure and promotion standards. See, for example, Substantive Standards Governing 
Tenure (George Washington Univ. Natl. Law Ctr. 1988) (on file with author): 
Quality and quantity of professional writings. While it is expected that the professional writ- 
ing standard ordinarily will be fulfilled through the production of published scholarly books, 
articles, or teaching materials, other materials, such as briefs or other studies, may, if they 
fully evidence comparable attributes of scholarship, be considered in partial fulfillment of 
the requirement. While no numerical bright line test can be specified, it is expected that at 
the time of the decision to recommend tenure there will be a minimum of two scholarly 
articles, or the equivalent, of high quality, measured by thoroughness of research, critical 
analysis, contribution to the field, and clarity of expression. 
Id. at 1 (second emphasis added). 
38. For an interesting treatment of subjective standards of excellence, see John Nivala, Zen 
and the Art of Becoming (and Being) a Lawyer, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387 (1992). 
39. See David L. Gregory, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1138, 1143 (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRITICAL EGAL STUDIES (1987)) (listing several law schools where critical legal 
studies is a sizeable influence); Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980's, 50 
OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (1989) (describing the ability of these movements to dominate the personality 
of a school); see also Loren Feldman, Tracking to the Right at George Mason, AM. LAW., Dec. 
1991, at 60; Richard M. Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 505 (1987). 
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Insofar as the disintegration of consensus is a relatively new phenome- 
non, however, developing over the past twenty-five years, we are likely 
experiencing now the anxiety that necessarily attends the reevaluation 
of our normative and logical imperatives. To an extent, that anxiety 
explains why we are often too eager to dismiss the contributions of 
colleagues who confront us with new ways of thinking. Further, be- 
cause we have not yet come to terms with the contributions that other 
disciplines may make to our understanding of the role of law, we may 
ignore what we have trouble understanding, labeling it pretentious and 
unhelpful. Indeed, our too frequent failure to review conscientiously 
and to take seriously our colleagues' teaching and scholarship may, in 
part, be the unfortunate consequence of our failure to appreciate the 
promise of ultimate integration through this transitional period of dis- 
integration of consensus. 
It is true that a good deal of the scholarship proceeding from alter- 
native perspectives does not advance the literature, being pretentious, 
ultimately insubstantial. The same, though, could be said of a good 
deal of doctrinal work: remember Christopher Columbus Langdell? 
If all that we do with important work written from alternative per- 
spectives is dismiss it as insubstantial, that is troubling. However, I 
suspect that, in time, the good alternative work will distinguish itself 
notwithstanding resistance to innovative ways of thinking. 
From the other side, however, the development of alternative per- 
spectives presents a danger to the legal academy: some people will 
reject what they do not understand or even try to understand and then 
accuse others who find value in it of serving an insidious agenda. 
I am neither willing to give up on discerning the piece that makes 
the important incremental contribution from the piece that does not 
advance the inquiry, nor to accuse those who conclude that a work 
does not make a contribution of having reached that conclusion to 
vindicate an insidious agenda. I suspect I am in the vast majority of 
conscientious academicians in this regard. I fear that Company will 
suggest to the reader that that sense of professionalism is not generally 
to be found in the academy. That is most discouraging. 
CONCLUSION 
Getman's book, perhaps more than any other of its genre, reveals 
the stuff of the academician, the toil of Wolfe's (not King's) firestarter. 
What Getman says, certainly because of his experience and perspec- 
tive, challenges the legal academy. We teach the best and the bright- 
est, often to the chagrin of our liberal arts colleagues, and we take 
credit for teaching law students to think about things in a way that no 
other discipline demands. Then, so empowered, our graduates set out 
to change the way things are. It is not mere vanity to observe that 
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they take a good part of us with them, maybe to a greater extent than 
they reflect the lessons of any teachers who have preceded us. 
If we take the role of the legal academic that seriously, if nothing 
less than our society's way of life is at stake, then it may be easier to 
understand why access to and advancement within the academy is the 
focus of so much of our promise and pain. Though Getman takes us 
closer to an understanding of what is in the balance and the sensitivi- 
ties and insecurities of those who are charged with maintaining the 
integrity of the academy, his unfortunate treatment of the tenure issue 
does not move us far enough away from the invective that has ob- 
scured our objectives and impugned the integrity of our mission. 
